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Account of the Attack on the Church
in St. Martin-de-Fontenay by “D”
Company, Fusiliers de Mont-Royal,
31 July-1 August 1944 as told by
Major Jacques Dextraze to Captain
Engler at St. Martin-de-Fontenay,
3 August 1944.
My company, “D” Company, had newreinforcement officers and its strength at
this time was 80 all ranks which resulted in
about 72 fighting men. In three platoons I had
two officers, a sergeant, a corporal, and a lance
corporal. The company was protecting the left
flank of the battalion and was about a thousand
yards away from our own troops on either side.
One platoon was in the house 02546075 and in
the garden to the left of the house. Another
platoon was behind in the orchard to the NORTH
of the house. The third platoon was behind and
to the right of the other two platoons.
Our information was that there were about
twenty men in the church, the church yard and
the surrounding hedges. The intention of the
brigade commander was that my battalion, Les
Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR), would seize and
hold the church which previously had been
attacked several times unsuccessfully.
I was resting with “B” Echelon in CAEN for
three days and was planning to go that evening
to BAYEUX to have dinner with a French family
there. That afternoon, out of mere curiosity, I
attended a brigade “O” Group, heard the
discussion concerning the attack on the church
and probably presented too many ideas for my
own future comfort. As usually happens with
people who say how a thing should be done, I
Editor’s Note: General J.A. Dextraze, “J Dex” to Canada’s post-war army, served as Chief of the
Defence Staff from 1972 to 1975 but in 1944 he was a 24-year-old company commander in Les
Fusiliers de Mont-Royal (FMR). This account of the action carried out by his company on 1 August
1944 offers a graphic description of the challenges confronting the Canadians during the battles
for Verrières Ridge. This attack was conducted in the context of Montgomery’s orders to “keep up
the pressure on the Caen area…to make easier the task of the American armies fighting hard on
the western flank.” (27 July 1944)
The church at St. Martin-de-Fontenay had been seized by the enemy in the aftermath of Operation
“Spring,” 25 July 1944.  The FMR successes on 31 July allowed 2nd Division to begin the advance
of 8/9 August, Operation “Totalize,” from a secure startline.
Though written in the first person, this report was drafted by Captain Joe Engler, the historical
officer assigned to 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. It was his job to collect important documents
and records, as well as to conduct interviews with the fighting soldiers which would allow later
historical narratives to be accurately written. Engler had the dubious distinction of being the
only historical officer to be killed in action when he drove into an ambush on 1 October 1944.
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was finally given the job. At 1800 hours my
commanding officer (CO) ordered me to report
to the unit which was several miles forward. I
arrived by 1930 hours completely out of the
picture as I had been left out of battle (LOB). I
was told the battalion plan and the CO’s intention
that my company should attack and hold the
church and churchyard. I got to my company
about 2200 hours. Its situation was that the road
running EAST and WEST through ST MARTIN-
DE-FONTENAY to VERRIERES was no-man’s-
land. The orchards NORTH of that road were
our front, although some enemy snipers were
hidden in buildings NORTH of the road and to
our right for several days. SOUTH of the road,
in the church 025607, in the cemetery
surrounding it, and in the large walled orchard
to the SOUTH, and in the buildings WEST of
the church, the enemy had his positions. On each
flank and on his front he held high ground giving
him excellent observation on our every moment.
My recce was made in three-quarters of an
hour before last light from the house, from the
exit from the house, and along the road to the
right of the house. This last recce along the road
was dangerous as Jerry was throwing grenades
over the wall every five or ten minutes. I had an
air photo and studied it for a few minutes but
soon darkness came and I could not see nor did
I dare show a light.
My first view of the situation made me feel
that we could never take and hold the place. After
my recce I finally called my “O” Group and
explained to each what I wanted done. Because
of the closeness of the enemy and the nature of
the attack, surprise was of great importance.
Also, because I had so few NCOs, I felt obliged
to explain my plan personally to every section
leader and to impress individually upon him
what I intended.
My intention was to capture and hold the
church, the cemetery, and the church-yard at all
costs.
Method
Medium machine guns (MMGs) were toprotect the exposed left flank from H until
H plus 20 sweeping along the edge of the road
from the southeast corner of the church orchard
EAST to the sunken track 028607, and road
junction to the left.
Artillery – One field regiment from H until H
plus 20 fired on area from point 020606 EAST
to point 025605. This included the high ground
at the end of the orchard 400 yds in front of my
position. 3-inch mortars from H until H plus 20
was to fire 400 yards left of the church along the
road running EAST-WEST.
Infantry – 16 Platoon was to remain where they
were in the large L-shaped building NORTH of
the road and NE of the church. They were to act
as a firm base for our operation and were to
give light machine gun (LMG or Bren) covering
Jacques Dextraze (second from left in sheepskin coat), holds an Orders Group in a house in Munderloh, Germany, 29
April 1945. At the time Dextraze wrote the report on the action in St. Martin-de-Fontenay he was a major commanding
“D” Company of Les Fusiliers de Mont-Royal, but by the end of the war he had been promoted to lieutenent-colonel in
command of the regiment.
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fire. This house is a three story house and the
upper story overlooks the larger part of the
church-yard. Eight LMGs were sited in it. Two
were to engage the hedge on the left of the church-
yard. Six others were to engage the orchard, the
church, and the cemetery surrounding the
church. In addition to giving this fire support
the platoon at all costs was to maintain this firm
base.
18 Platoon was to form up in the yard to the
left of the building. At H plus 2 they were to cross
the road, mount the little wall on the SOUTH
side of the road, and enter the field (02566069)
turn right and using fire and movement get
through the breach in the wall and clear all the
ground SOUTH of the church as far as the
SOUTH wall of the yard. The leading section of
18 Platoon, when it went through the gap in the
wall, would turn left and head straight SOUTH
along the hedge to take out an MG in the SE
corner of the church-yard which could not be
covered by fire from the house. The other
sections were to head WEST across the orchard
and clear it from the NORTH end, near the
cemetery, to the SOUTH wall.
17 Platoon had varied tasks, No.4 Section
was to take out an LMG situated in the NE corner
of the churchyard 02546070, when the first
round of supporting artillery fire fell. As
equipment this section took No.36 grenades,
rifles, and one LMG. The Section, after getting
the MG post inside the orchard in the NE corner,
was to remain at that corner and cover the road
WEST of that point. Their forming up point
(FUP) for taking the MG out was directly across
the road from this MG. 5 and 6 Sections were to
form up behind our HQ building where 18
Platoon was ready to go at 0445 hours. They
were to follow 18 Platoon into the church-yard,
clear the cemetery, the church and the area
around it.
One hour was devoted to getting the men
noiselessly into this court-yard flat on their
bellies with the noses of the leading men almost
on the road.
Consolidation
On consolidation 16 Platoon was to continueat and around the house. 17 Platoon was to
put two sections in the right at the corner of the
church-yard covering the road and having Brens
30 yards in front of the church and sweeping it.
18 Platoon, after clearing the whole church-yard,
was to withdraw NORTH and take up positions
SOUTH of the church not more than 50 yards
and not less than 30 yards from it. This was in
order to secure safety from shelling and at the
same time economize my small force.
Every man carried entrenching tools and a
pick or shovel tied to their back. Each man wore
A soldier from Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal on a patrol through the destroyed village of May-sur-Orne, 9 August 1944.
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skeleton web and carried a 50-round bandolier,
two grenades, one tin of bully-beef, a package of
hard-tack, and a 24-hour emergency ration. Most
of this fitted into the Bren pouches, and the Bren
magazines themselves were inside their tunics.
My HQ remained in the house with 16 Platoon.
H-Hour was 0530 hours, 1 August 1944.
During the night and early morning I briefed
each of the NCOs personally and every section
leader as well. I finished this job at 0400 hours.
I had each section leader view his startline and
the place where his section would form up before
the attack. I slept from 0400 hours till 0430
hours.
The forming up went just as I had ordered.
This took one hour. The courtyard is very small
and within grenade range of the enemy positions.
At this time it was covered with broken tile from
nearby roofs. Essential to the success and even
to the safety of my company in this phase was
absolute surprise and absolute silence. Thus it
took a full hour to place all my men in position
in this dark and noisy and crowded courtyard.
An original portion of the plan was to have a
section of pioneers blow holes in the wall along
the road at each end of the NORTH wall of the
church-yard. After my recce I cancelled this part
of the plan because it would have meant suicide
for the pioneers and loss of surprise in our
attack. We would have had to go over the wall
into the road, cross the road and go through the
holes in the wall into the church-yard, all in
moonlight with Jerry’s small arms fire enfilading
the road. This would have been disastrous. PIATs
had already been tried but their effect on these
To assist in planning his attack on the Church and Church yard in St. Martin-de-Fontenay, Major Dextraze would have
had access to a 1:25,000 scale map and aerial reconnaissance photographs, very similar to map and air photo reproduced
here. The specific locations given by Dextraze in his report (6- and 8- figure map grid references) can be plotted on the
map above.
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walls was only to make a small hole large enough
only for firing through but not for assaulting
through. If the enemy had not been so close we
could have used this method of attack. We would
have been subjected only to the sniping from a
distance. As it was, being close, we were
subjected at all times to grenades and rifle and
automatic fire lobbing at us and sweeping us.
Just while we were starting to form up one enemy
LMG moved up right in the front of the door of
the house. We had to push him out with grenades
before we could form up. We covered what noise
we could not avoid making as we formed up by
small arms fire which would not be in so great a
volume as to arouse his suspicions. He just fired
whenever he heard a noise or in reply to our
fire.
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This air photo, taken on 18 July 1944, shows the Church and Church yard in
St. Martin-de-Fontenay captured by “D” Company, Les Fusiliers de Mont-
Royal on 1 August 1944. Dextraze would have carried an air photo very similiar
to this during his recce of their objective on the evening before the assault.
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From H until H plus 2 all the enemy fire
covering the road was neutralized. Then my
artillery came down and one shell fell short about
20 yards in front of my startline. It look 15
minutes until I got the fire moved forward and
all this time I had to keep my men flat on the
ground and absolutely silent, in the tiny
courtyard. It was too far away for me to hold the
eager men in 4 Section who were to take out the
MG at the NE corner of the church-yard. This
section went forward according to the original
plan and wiped out the gunner with grenades.
At H plus 15 the remainder of the attack went in
according to the original plan. The officer in
charge of the leading platoon was wounded in
the leg by small arms fire just as he started out.
Corporal Lambert reported the loss to me and I
shouted at him to take charge immediately. He
carried through the job very coolly as if nothing
had happened. Having been briefed thoroughly
he found no difficulty in carrying out his orders.
The platoon got into the field and to the gap in
the side of the wall. 17 Platoon’s two other
sections went in a few seconds later and did a
fine job on the cemetery and the church. One
Bren gunner and one riflemen went into the
church. They found three Nazis sleeping. High
up on the scantlings along each window were
three LMGs sited on our position in the house
and 45 minutes after zero hour the whole show
was completed. The area was entirely cleared
and we were consolidating. Quite a lot of slit
trenches had been dug in the orchard and
around the church and these gave immediate
protection. We used them at once and improved
them later.
Half an hour later Jerry counterattacked
coming in one section strength. This attack came
from the SE corner of the orchard, and was
broken up at once. 15 minutes later a second
counterattack, two sections strong, came from
the opposite corner and this was also smashed.
One hour after these attacks he started mortaring
us and kept this up for 36 hours almost without
stopping.
In the attack itself the company had ten
casualties, one of which was fatal. From the
shelling after there were about 20 casualties. In
addition to shelling us he used self-propelled (SP)
guns and aimed directly at our slit trenches and
also swept the orchard with MG fire from his
tanks. Next day he succeeded in working a MG
forward about 300 yards along the road to the
left of my position. After the first burst of fire
that MG was silenced from our own Brens.
In the attack I had all my gunners put the
gas regulator at the largest hole so as to produce
the highest volume of fire. Jerry knowing our
weapons establishment so well thought it was a
whole battalion attack and most of his men began
running SOUTH through the orchard where they
were mowed down by our overhead fire from
the house. We killed or wounded all told about
30 men in the 45 minutes. Since the attack in
the last two days we have probably taken 10
The church at St. Martin-de-Fontenay is visible in the centre of this photo, taken in 1946. The photograph was taken from
just north of St. André-sur-Orne looking to the southeast from the main north-south road running through St. André and
St. Martin. The commanding position of the church in the small valley clearly explains the rationale behind the orders
given to Dextraze.
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more. Two days later, that is on the night of 2/3
August, a platoon put in a counterattack against
us. With our Brens all on fixed lines we were
protected and covered on all flanks. As soon as
the platoon in the orchard opened fire all the
other Brens opened and the attack was driven
off. In front of our position in the church-yard
we have set out a string of No.75 grenades, tin-
cans from our rations, and altogether erected
an obstacle across the orchard. We have made
good use of his equipment and now have our
own telephones linking Company HQ with the
forward platoon in the church-yard. During the
first 76 hours after the attack he shelled our HQ
with medium artillery. Before he could get a
direct hit on the house the platoon and everyone
in Company HQ was evacuated except one
foward observation officer (FOO) and a platoon
commmader who were killed while still on the
first floor. After knocking the house to bits he
stopped his shelling and we were able to come
back as we are now with our Bren guns back on
fixed lines.
Lessons
Brief NCOs personally when possible or makesure that they are carefully briefed. The old
adage, “Win the fire fight,” still holds. This must
be certain before the attack goes in. In the actual
attack itself yell like hell. This keeps everyone
cool and in good temper, in fact men start to
laugh. Have a simple plan. Site your weapons to
cover the enemy fully even if this means exposing
yourself somewhat.
Much of our success is to be attributed to
the good information which we had concerning
the enemy. Although we are seriously at fault in
underestimating his strength, thinking he had
only a platoon of about 20 men where there
actually turned out to be 45, we did have exact
knowledge of his dispositions. This we obtained
by our firing during the day and during the
period of preparation. It was possible to assign
to each Bren gunner a specific enemy position
which he was to neutralize.
This photograph was taken from the northern edge of May-sur-Orne in 1946. The tall building on the right side of the
photo is the Church in St. Martin-de-Fontenay while the mine tower in the “factory” area is visible on the left side of the
photo.
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A soldier from Les Fusiliers de Mont-Royal on patrol in
May-sur-Orne, 9 August 1944.
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